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Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update

22 February 2024, 08:30 hours; Rome

Overview

This update covers avian influenza viruses (AIV) with zoonotic potential occurring worldwide, i.e. H5Nx, H7Nx high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses and H3N8, H5Nx, H6N1, H7Nx, H9N2, H10Nx and H11 low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI).

Specific information is available for Avian Influenza A(H7N9) virus viruses and Sub-Saharan Africa HPAI in related FAO Avian Influenza situation updates.

HPAI outbreaks in animals officially reported since last update (28 December 2023): in total, 645 outbreaks/events have been reported in five geographic regions caused by H5Nx (24), H5N1 (608), H5N5 (6), H5N6 (4), and H7N6 (3). (see Table 1 for details)

LPAI events in animals officially reported since the last update (25 January 2024): 3 new events were reported.

Number of human cases officially reported since last update (25 January 2024): 7 new events were reported.1,2,3,4,5,6

1 https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2024-DON501
2 https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=797080835782015&set=pcb.797080865782012
3 https://www.ndcpa.gov.cn/jbkzzx/c100008/common/content/content_1752234546782195712.html
4 https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=799031388920293&set=pcb.799031448920287
5 https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=804481568375275&set=pcb.804481598375272
6 https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202402/21/P2024022100729.htm

Map 1. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed since 1 October 2023 (i.e. current wave)

Note: Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Map 2. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed in the period 1 October 2022 to 30 September 2023 (i.e. previous wave)

Note: Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Table 1. High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses with zoonotic potential

H5Belgium19/12/20231
(in W)
1
(in W)
Common Buzzard
Japan08/02/202410
(in W)
9
(in W)
Carrion crow, Crow, Large-billed crow
Norway20/02/202414
(incl. W3)
Poultry
Peru19/02/20241264
(incl. W40, C4)
Layer
South Africa11/01/2024222
(incl. W1)
Poultry
United States of America328/01/20249
(in W, EA, rEN)
89
(in W)
American green-winged teal, American wigeon, Blue-winged teal, Canada goose, Gadwall, Mallard, Northern shoveler, Wood duck
H5N1Austria31/01/20244
(incl. W2)
24
(incl. W20)
Common Crane, Mute Swan
Belgium21/01/20242
(in W)
9
(incl. W5)
Common Buzzard, Eurasian oystercatcher
Bosnia and Herzegovina06/02/20241
(in W)
1
(in W)
Mute Swan
Brazil07/02/20243
(in W)
9
(incl. W41, M5)
Common Tern, White-faced Ibis
Bulgaria20/02/202477Poultry
Cambodia08/02/2024312Poultry
Canada108/02/202413
(incl. W7, M1, EA, rEN)
79
(incl. W20, M4)
Non-poultry birds; American Wigeon, Anatidae, Black-billed Magpie, Blue Jay, Blue-winged Teal, Cackling Goose, Canada Goose, Common Raven, Gadwall, Golden Eagle, Lesser Scaup, Mallard, Northern Pintail, Snow Goose, Trumpeter Swan, Tundra Swan, Wood Duck; Striped skunk
Chile03/07/20234
(incl. W3)
4
(incl. W3)
Non-poultry birds; Belcher’s Gull, Guanay Cormorant, Kelp Gull, Peruvian Booby
China16/02/20241126
(incl. W4, E2)
Chicken, duck, goose; feces of Anatidae
Cyprus02/02/20241
(in W)
1
(in W)
Peregrin falcon
Czech Republic09/02/202417
(incl. W5, EA, rEN)
26
(incl. W5, EA)
Chicken, duck, goose; Grey Heron, Greylag Goose, Mallard, Mute Swan
Denmark15/02/202430
(incl. W22)
64
(incl. W51)
Chicken, turkey; Barnacle Goose, Black-headed Gull, Common Buzzard, Common Coot, Eurasian Sparrowhawk, Greylag Goose, Herring Gull, Hooded Crow, Mallard, Mute Swan, Pink-footed Goose
Falkland Island (Malvinas)07/02/20241
(in W)
1
(in W)
Brown skua, Southern Rockhopper Penguin, Spheniscidae (unspecified)
Finland04/09/20235
(in M)
71
(incl. W4, M67)
American Mink, Arctic fox, Common raccoon dog, Red Fox
France14/02/20242
(in W, EA)
13
(in W)
Black-headed Gull, Herring Gull
Germany16/02/202446
(incl. W37, M1)
85
(incl.
W92, C1, M1)
Chicken, turkey; Accipitridae, Anatidae, Charadriidae, Corvidae, Cygnus, Laridae, Rallidae, Sulidae; Red Fox
Hungary08/02/20241
(in W)
124
(incl. W48)
Mute Swan
Israel24/01/20244
(in W)
10
(incl. W6)
Common Teal, Herring Gull, Peregrine Falcon, Yellow-legged Gull
Italy19/02/20243
(incl. W2)
25
(incl W19)
Black-headed Gull, Common Teal
Japan13/02/202412
(incl. W10)
106 (incl.
W82, C2, E14)
Chicken; Large-billed crow, Whooper swan
Republic of Korea04/02/20243
(in W)
14*
(incl. W8)
Dick; Gadwall, Golden Eagle, wild bird carcass
* Including H5N1, H5N6 mix infection on a duck farm
Lithuania30/01/20241
(in W)
2
(incl. W1)
Mute Swan
Republic of Moldova14/02/202413
(incl. W2, EA)
62
(incl W29)
Poultry, Mute Swan
Nigeria26/01/20241
(in C)
1
(in C)
Farmed peacock
The Philippines30/11/20231111Poultry
Poland20/02/202418
(incl. W4)
37
(incl. W11)
Poultry; Mute Swan
Romania16/02/20245
(in W)
32
(in W29)
Mew Gull, Mute Swan, Whooper Swan
Russian Federation01/02/202419Poultry
Slovakia02/02/202433Poultry
Slovenia06/02/20249
(in W)
10
(in W)
Anatidae, Black-headed Gull, Great Egret, Mute Swan
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands09/02/2024§>1
(in W, M)
>5
(in W, M)
Albatross, Antarctic tern, brown skuas, kelp gull; elephant seal, fur seal
Spain14/12/20233
(in W)
17
(in W)
Audouin’s Gull, Black-headed Gull, Caspian Tern, Mediterranean Gull
Sweden08/02/202411
(in W)
32
(incl. W30)
Barnacle Goose, Common Buzzard, Herring Gull, Mallard, Mute Swan, Northern Goshawk, Western Jackdaw
Ukraine07/02/20245
(incl. W3)
12
(incl. W5)
Unspecified Domestic Birds; Mute Swan
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland214/02/20242
(incl. W1)
32
(in W30)
commercial poultry, Herring Gull
United States of America320/02/2024350
(incl. W331, M1, EA, rEN)
1 941
(incl. W1699, C1, M3, EA, rEN)
Chicken, Duck, Turkey, Game bird, Unspecified poultry; American black duck, American coot, American crow, American green-winged teal, American white pelican, American wigeon, Bald eagle, Barred owl, Black vulture, Black-bellied plover, Blue-winged teal, Bonaparte’s gull, Cackling goose, California quail, Canada goose, Cinnamon teal, Common raven, Cooper’s hawk, Gadwall, Great horned owl, greater scaup, Gull (unidentified), Harris hawk, Hooded merganser, House sparrow, Lesser scaup, Mallard, Mallard/Black duck hybrid, Merlin, Muscovy duck, Northern pintail, Northern shoveler, Peregrine falcon, Redhead duck, Red-necked grebe, Red-tailed hawk, Ring-billed gull, Ross’s goose, Ruddy duck, Snow goose, Snowy plover, Trumpeter swan, Tundra swan, Turkey vulture, Western gull, Western sandpiper, Wood duck; Raccoon
Viet NamJanuary11Chicken, unspecified poultry
H5N5Canada29/06/20232
(in W)
2
(in W)
Great black-backed Gull, Herring Gull, Northern Fulmar
Germany16/01/20243
(in W)
4
(in W)
Anatidae, Laridae
Iceland18/11/20231
(in W)
7
(in W)
Common Raven
H5N6Japan10/02/202412
(incl. W1)
Chicken
Republic of Korea08/02/20243
(incl. W1)
38*
(incl. W10, E2)
Duck; wild bird carcass
* Including H5N1, H5N6 mix infection on a duck farm
H7N6South Africa18/12/2023385Poultry

Data was retrieved from WOAH WAHIS portal, government websites. Data cut off time: reported on 22 February 2024 8:30 CEST. $:estimate.
The full list of bird and mammalian species affected by H5Nx HPAI are available HERE.
Notes: Only those reporting events in animals since 24 August 2023 are listed in the table, those reporting for the first time since 1 October 2023 in orange. Codes: D:domestic, C:captivity, W:wild birds, F: Feral, E:Environment, M: mammalian species other than humans, example: W123 indicates 123 wild birds affected. EA: Fully Eurasian; rEN: Reassortment Eurasian and North American.
1 the total includes events with sample collection date since 1 October 2023 data issued from the Canada Food and Inspection Agency dashboard [link]
2 a detailed list of wild bird species affected, consult weekly findings report on avian influenza in wild birds from Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) [link]
3 for more information, consult dedicated webpage of the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA/APHIS) [link]
§: British Antarctic Survey (BAS) [link]

Table 2. Low Pathogenicity Avian Influenza A Viruses with zoonotic potential: events reported in animals or the environment since the last update

VirusCountry/AreaLast detection# events reported since the last updateTotal # events reported since 1 October 2023Species affected during the reporting preiod
H7N1Republic of Korea01/02/20241
(in E)
3
(in E)
Wild bird faeces
China (Taiwan Province)21/01/20241
(in E)
1
(in E)
Feces of Anatidae
H7N7Republic of Korea30/01/20141
(in W)
2
(in W)
Wildbird

Source: Veterinary authorities.

Recent publications

WILD BIRDS

Jeglinski, J.W.E., Lane, J.V., Votier, S.C., Furness, R.W., Hamer, K.C., McCafferty, D.J., Nager, R.G., et al. 2024. HPAIV outbreak triggers short-term colony connectivity in a seabird metapopulation. Sci Rep, 14(1):3126. reference

Yang, Q., Wang, B., Lemey, P., Dong, L., Mu, T., Wiebe, R.A., Guo, F., et al. 2024. Synchrony of Bird Migration with Global Dispersal of Avian Influenza Reveals Exposed Bird Orders. Nat Commun,  15(1):1126. reference

Olawuyi, K., Orole, O., Meseko, C., Monne, I., Shittu, I., Bianca, Z., Fusaro, A., et al. Detection of clade 2.3.4.4 highly pathogenic avian influenza H5 viruses in healthy wild birds in the Hadeji-Nguru wetland, Nigeria 2022. Influenza Other Respir Viruses, 18(2):e13254. reference

Glazunova, A., Krasnova, E., Bespalova, T., Sevskikh, T., Lunina, D., Titov, I., Sindryakova, I. & Blokhin, A. 2024. A highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4 detected in Samara Oblast, Russian Federation. Front Vet Sci, 11 – 2024. reference

MAMMALS

Bessière, P., Gaide, N., Croville, G., Crispo, M., Fusade-Boyer, M., Abou Monsef, Y., Dirat, M., et al. 2024. High pathogenicity avian influenza A (H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus infection in a captive Tibetan black bear (Ursus thibetanus): investigations based on paraffin-embedded tissues, France, 2022. Microbiol Spectr, e0373623. reference

DOMESTIC

Seekings, A.H., Liang, Y., Warren, C.J., Hjulsager, C.K., Thomas, S.S., Lean, F.Z.X., Nunez, A., et al. 2024. Transmission dynamics and pathogenesis differ between pheasants and partridges infected with clade 2.3.4.4b H5N8 and H5N1 high-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses. J Gen Virol, 105(1). reference

H5N1
Castro-Sanguinetti, G.R., González-Veliz, R., Callupe-Leyva, A., Apaza-Chiara, A.P., Jara, J., Silva, W., Icochea, E. & More-Bayona, J.A. 2024. Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b from Peru forms a monophyletic group with Chilean isolates in South America. Sci Rep, 14(1):3635. reference

de Araújo, A.C., Silva, L.M.N., Cho, A.Y., Repenning, M., Amgarten, D., de Moraes, A.P., Malta, F., et al. 2024. Incursion of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Clade 2.3.4.4b Virus, Brazil, 2023. Emerg Infect Dis, 30(3). reference

Nagy, A., Stará, M., Černíková, L., Kličková, E., Horák, O., Hofmannová, L. & Sedlák, K. 2024. Enzootic Circulation, Massive Gull Mortality and Poultry Outbreaks during the 2022/2023 High-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza H5N1 Season in the Czech Republic. Viruses, 16(2):221. reference

OTHER AI VIRUSES

Yang, J., Lan, R., Chang, H., Li, H., Yu, H., Tong, Q., Liu, J. & Sun, H. 2024. Isolation and characterization of genotype 4 Eurasian avian-like H1N1 influenza virus in pigs suffering from pneumonia. Virology, 592:110009. reference

Li, Y., Zhao, C., Guo, Y., Dong, J., Du, F., Zhou, Y., Shu, S., et al. 2024. Genetic and Biological Characteristics of Duck-Origin H4N6 Avian Influenza Virus Isolated in China in 2022. Viruses, 16(2):207. reference

Zeng, J., Du, F., Xiao, L., Sun, H., Lu, L., Lei, W., Zheng, J., et al. 2024. Spatiotemporal genotype replacement of H5N8 avian influenza viruses contributed to H5N1 emergence in 2021/2022 panzootic. J Virol, 2024 Feb 15:e0140123. reference

Yao, Q., Liu, L., Liu, H., Zhou, Y., Huo, M., Li, Y., Gao, Y. & Ge, Y. 2024. One-Health Challenge in H9N2 Avian Influenza: Novel Human-Avian Reassortment Virus in Guangdong Province, China. Hindawi Transboundary and Emerging Diseases, 2024:9913934. reference

Liu, K., Qi, X., Bao, C., Wang, X. & Liu, X. 2024. Novel H10N3 avian influenza viruses: a potential threat to public health. Lancet Microbe, 2024 Jan 31:S2666-5247(23)00409-3. reference

Flores, R.A., Cammayo-Fletcher, P.L.T., Nguyen, B.T., Villavicencio, A.G.M., Lee, S.Y., Son, Y., Kim, J-H, et al. 2024. Genetic Characterization and Phylogeographic Analysis of the First H13N6 Avian Influenza Virus Isolated from Vega Gull in South Korea. Viruses, 16(2):285. reference

CONTROL

Studniski, M., Stumvoll, K., Kromm, M., Ssematimba, A., Marusak, R., Xing, Z., Halvorson, D., Culhane, M. & Cardona, C. 2024. Vaccination of Poultry Against Influenza. Avian Dis. 67(4):402-409. reference

Scoizec, A., Niqueux, E., Schmitz, A., Grasland, B., Palumbo, L., Huneau-Salaün, A. & Le Bouquin, S. 2024. New Patterns for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza and Adjustment of Prevention, Control and Surveillance Strategies: The Example of France. Viruses, 16(1):101. reference

DISINFECTION

Sobhy, N.M., Muñoz, A.Q., Youssef, C.R.B. & Goyal, S.M. 2024. Inactivation of Three Subtypes of Influenza A Virus by a Commercial Device Using Ultraviolet Light and Ozone. Avian Dis, 67(4):305-309. reference

ENVIRONMENT

Kenmoe, S., Takuissu, G.R., Ebogo-Belobo, J.T., Kengne-Ndé, C., Mbaga, D.S., Bowo-Ngandji, A., Ondigui Ndzie, J.L., et al. 2024. A systematic review of influenza virus in water environments across human, poultry, and wild bird habitats. Water Res X, 22:100210. reference

Kuchinski, K.S., Coombe, M., Mansour, S.C., Cortez, G.A.P., Kalhor, M., Himsworth, C.G. & Prystajecky, N.A. 2024. Targeted genomic sequencing of avian influenza viruses in wetland sediment from wild bird habitats. Appl Environ Microbiol,  2024 Jan 23:e0084223. reference

DISEASE INTELLIGENCE

Fang, K., Song, W., Zhang, Y., Zheng, Y., You, C., Hu, J., Liu, L., et al. 2024. Comparative analysis and prediction of avian influenza in Shangrao city, China from 2016 to 2022. Virology, 592:109995. reference

Farzin, H.R., Ajam, G., Asgharzadeh, M., Zanguei Motlagh, Z., Ghasemitabas, S., Tabatabaeizadeh, S.E., Zibaee, S. & Jamshidian-Mojaver, M. 2024. The role of the major viral pathogens in a respiratory disease outbreak of broiler flocks in Eastern Iran. Iran J Vet Res, 24(3):205-214. reference

ASSAY
Lee, D.H., Torchetti, M.K., Killian, M.L., Brown, I. & Swayne, D.E. 2024. Genome sequences of hemagglutinin cleavage site predict the pathogenicity phenotype of avian influenza virus: statistically validated data for facilitating rapid declarations and reducing reliance on in vivo testing. Avian Pathol, 2024 Feb 12:1-42. reference

Croville, G., Walch, M., Sécula, A., Lèbre, L., Silva, S., Filaire, F. & Guérin, J.L. 2024. An amplicon-based nanopore sequencing workflow for rapid tracking of avian influenza outbreaks, France, 2020-2022. Front Cell Infect Microbiol, 14:1257586. reference

GENERAL OVERVIEW

Li, Y., An, Q., Sun, Z., Gao, X. & Wang, H. 2024. Multifaceted analysis of temporal and spatial distribution and risk factors of global poultry HPAI-H5N1, 2005-2023. Animal, 18(3):101085. reference

Kirkeby, C., Boklund, A., Larsen, L.E. & Ward, M.P. 2024. Are all avian influenza outbreaks in poultry the same? The predicted impact of poultry species and virus subtype. Zoonoses Public Health, 2024 Feb 16. reference

Grace, D., Knight-Jones, T.J.D., Melaku, A., Alders, R. & Jemberu, W.T. 2024. The Public Health Importance and Management of Infectious Poultry Diseases in Smallholder Systems in Africa. Foods, 13(3):411. reference

Mahmoud, M., Badra, R., Kandeil, A., El-Shesheny, R., Abdallah, J., Ali, M.A. & Kayali, G. 2024. Role of research Laboratories in pandemic and epidemic response in the Eastern Mediterranean Region: Experiences from COVID-19, avian influenza, and MERS-CoV. Influenza Other Respir Viruses, 18(2):e13257. reference

FAO’s support to countries

Global level
  • FAO shared Alert on avian influenza during Lunar New Year festivities in Asia. [link]
  • The FAO Virtual Learning Centers have launched a new self-paced virtual learning course on avian influenza (AI). The course aims to raise awareness of AI and to develop capacity on its detection and prevention. This introductory course is intended to be useful for veterinarians, veterinary paraprofessionals and others working in the poultry industries. There are six short modules (15-20 minutes each), can be used as a ready-reference resource as needed. It supports multiple platforms including smartphones and tablets. [link]
  • OFFLU (WOAH/FAO network of expertise on animal influenza) contributed information on the genetic and antigenic characteristics of currently circulating avian and swine influenza viruses for pandemic preparedness purposes at the WHO Consultation on the Composition of Influenza Virus Vaccines for Use in the 2024-2025 Northern Hemisphere Influenza Season. [link]
  • On 21 December 2023 OFFLU (WOAH/FAO network of expertise on animal influenza) released its statement « Continued expansion of high pathogenicity avian influenza H5 in wildlife in South America and incursion into the Antarctic region”. [link]
Regional/country level
  • Americas
    • A joint technical meeting on HPAI was held with countries under emergency technical cooperation programme (TCP) and Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities (SFERA) projects on 12-14 December 2023 [link], the emergency TCP project has been extended till June 2024. Under this TCP project, FAO has facilitated bi-weekly meetings between veterinary services of 10 countries in the region to discuss and exchange experiences on several HPAI topics including epidemiological updates, control measures, surveillance, economic impacts and risk communication.
    • FAO ECTAD at regional and country (Peru, Guatemala) levels are supporting activities to respond to HPAI outbreaks e.g. simulations exercises, HPAI diagnostic trainings, information materials.
    • GF-TADs regional webinar was held on 5 December 2023 on southward expansion of high pathogenicity avian influenza H5 in wildlife in South America and Antarctica, epidemiological surveillance and evolution of avian influenza virus in Latin America and the Caribbean, knowledge gaps, collaboration with OFFLU, vaccination strategies and management of vaccinated animal populations, surveillance and trade limitations, and actions within the Implementation Framework of Resolution No. 28 adopted at the 90th WOAH World Assembly (2023).
    • FAO Regional office for Latin America and Caribbean (RLC) presented HPAI epidemiological situation in Latin America at the OFFLU meeting for Latin America (Avian influenza situation) held on 9 November 2023.
    • FAO RLC organized and facilitated a webinar on “The future of HPAI in Latin America and the Caribbean: Impact of the new wave of migratory birds” on 31 October 2023 with various experts.
    • Currently, Bolivia, Dominican Republic (for prophylaxis; no outbreak reported), Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay are using vaccines to prevent and/or control HPAI, while some other countries are evaluating implementation.
  • Africa
    • FAO ECTAD regional offices in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) is supporting countries in the region to enhance biosecurity in poultry farms which contributes to minimising HPAI incursion. Poultry value chain risk assessment along the entire poultry value chain is planned in 10 countries namely Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia as a part of ECTAD’s ongoing support for HPAI risk mitigation/management.
    • After the index case, no new outbreak detected in Mozambique for more than three months. FAO ECTAD supported the veterinary services in sending samples to the Reference laboratory (IZS-Ve, Italy) for further analysis; the results of the full genome sequences showed 99.98% nucleotide identity with A/Chicken/South Africa/SA2310/2023 (H7N6) (GISAID EPI_ISL_18127195).
    • FAO ECTAD regional office in Western and Central Africa (WCA) organized a regional training workshop on good sampling practices at the Veterinary School in Dakar (EISMV) from 23 to 26 January with special attention to biosafety and biosecurity. A total of 18 participants from 10 countries in West, Central and East Africa received theoretical and practical training in collecting diagnostic specimens from poultry.
    • FAO ECTAD WCA is monitoring suspected HPAI outbreaks in multiple countries in the region and providing various supports including provision of laboratory reagents and consumables as well as transport of diagnostic specimens to the reference laboratory (IZS-Ve) for further confirmaiton and sequencing.
    • FAO ECTAD Benin supported epidemiological investigation of suspected avian influenza outbreak in Parakou. [link]
    • In Guinea, FAO ECTAD has supported suspected HPAI outbreak investigation in Labé. The new good guidelines on biosecurity practices and indicators for the poultry sector were introduced to 40 stakeholders at a workshop on building producer resilience held in Forecariah. [link]
    • Niger confirmed an outbreak of H5N1 HPAI by the Niamey Central Laboratory (LABOCEL) on 27 January 2024 on a family farm in Niamey. The biosafety equipment (personal protective equipment [PPE], disinfectants, bags for biohazard waste), which FAO ECTAD prepared at the beginning of current influenza season under a HPAI prevention and control project, supported General Directorate of Veterinary Services in conducting rapid response.
  • North Africa and Middle East
    • FAO ECTAD Egypt in the Regional office for Near East and North Africa (RNE) is supporting the implementation of the targeted risk-based surveillance plan for 2024 to understand the prevalence of Avian Influenza sub-types currently circulating in Egypt and to detect incursion of new subtypes as early as possible. The surveillance will cover 1) LBMs in high-risk districts of the selected high-risk governorates, 33 largest LBMs in 19 governorates have been selected according to the selective criteria mentioned above, 9 governorates from Upper Egypt (Giza, Fayoum, Beni-suef, Minya, Asyut, Sohag, Qena, Luxor and Aswan) and 10 governorates from Lower Egypt (Qalubia, Monofiya, Sharkia Gharbia, Dakahlia, Behera, Alexandria, Ismalia, Portsaid, and Suez) 2) domestic-wild/migratory bird interface, 34 Sites in 17 governorates at the migratory pathway namely, Sharkia, Isamailia, Suez, Port Said, Damietta, Dakahlia, Kafr-Elshiekh, Behera, Alexandria, Fayoum, Qena, Luxor, Aswan, Red Sea, Matrouh, North Sanai and South Sinai were defined by Ministry of Enviroemnt and 3) villages with high-density poultry populations.
    • FAO ECTAD Egypt supported the Central Laboratory for Evaluation of Veterinary Biologics (CLEVB), Egypt to perform a study to evaluate all available/marketed avian influenza vaccines (22 commercial vaccines) against the predominant circulating avian influenza strains in Egypt isolated in 2023.
    • FAO ECTAD Egypt supported the development of National One Health strategic framework which has been endorsed by the Government.
  • Asia
    • Since October 2023, Cambodia confirmed H5N1 HPAI in birds in seven provinces, while nine human cases reported. FAO Cambodia is collaborating National Animal Health and Production Research Institute (NAHPRI)/the General Directorate of Animal Health and Production (GDAHP) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the Institut Pasteur du Cambodge (IPC), WHO and other partners, participated in joint risk assessment, and providing technical assistance, awareness materials for distribution, and some PPE. [link1link2]
    • FAO ECTAD in the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (RAP) organizes a quarterly influenza coordination call on 6 February 2024 with ECTAD countries in Asia to discuss progress and challenges around avian influenza surveillance in the region.
    • FAO ECTAD Indonesia supported participation of four animal health laboratories in a regional proficiency testing for avian and swine diseases beeing organized by the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP).
    • In Indonesia, the IVM (influenza virus monitoring ) network meeting was conducted on 12-13 November in Yogyakarta to update and discuss the Avian Influenza virus strain currently circulating, as well as to update on newly detected H5N1 HPAI clade 2.3.4.4.b, andthe follow up surveillance and response needed.
    • FAO ECTAD in the Philippines, in collaboration with the Bureau of Animal Industry, organized a Coordination Meeting and Simulation Exercise for Animal Disease (Avian Influenza and foot-and-mouth disease) Emergencies for Mindanao Cluster in December 2023. The meeting specifically discussed the Philippine’s AI Vaccination Guidelines to seek inputs and agreement of veterinarians and animal health workers at the meeting. The same activity will be conducted in Visayas and North and South Luzon clusters during the 1st quarter of 2024.
    • FAO ECTAD Viet Nam and the Australian Center for Disease Preparedness (ADCP) visited laboratories in northern Viet Nam from 20 to 30 November 2023 and in the southern Viet Nam from 7 to 20 January 2024 to: re-assess DAH laboratories using Laboratory Mapping Tool (LMT); provide backstopping support on quality assurance and quality management; and develop a road map for ISO 17043 accreditation for NCVD to provide AI proficiency testing.
  • Europe and Central Asia
    • The Outbreak Costing Tool (OutCosT) to estimate the cost of outbreaks and their control is being adapted to poultry diseases.

More FAO’s support to countries

Figure 1. Number of countries reported HPAI since 01 October 2023 by subtype (left) and by region (right) as of 20 February 2024

Table 3. Epidemiological overview for avian influenza viruses viruses known to have caused zoonotic infections in the past 20 years

SubtypeEpidemiological situation overview
H5Nx Gs/GD* HPAI (1996)High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses within the Goose/Guangdong/1/96- lineage (Gs/GD) were first detected in geese in Guangdong Province, China in 1996. They have persisted, as high pathogenicity viruses, since then and have caused outbreaks in poultry across all regions globally other than Oceania. The initial viruses in this lineage were of the A(H5N1) subtype but other subtypes (including H5N2, H5N3 H5N5, H5N6, H5N8) have emerged, mainly in the past 10 years, as a result of reassortment with other avian influenza viruses. The common feature of these viruses is an HA gene related back to the original Gs/GD/96 virus. The HA gene of these viruses has evolved over the past 28 years, initially into 10 clades (clade 0 to 9) of which descendents of clade 2 viruses are the only ones that continue to circulate. Multiple 5th order clades persist such as the one that is currently dominant globally – clade 2.3.4.4b – whereas others have emerged and disappeared.Multiple genotypes carrying different combinations of the eight influenza A segmented genes have emerged presumably as a result of co-infection of birds with different avian inluenza viruses that also facilitated reassortment. Some important genotypes have been named unofficially (e.g. Z genotype in Hong Kong SAR, China in 2002, BB genotype derived from gulls in Europe in 2022 onwards). Of considerable significance has been reassortment with enzootic A(H9N2) viruses.Some of these Gs/GD viruses have produced severe zoonotic infections in humans, first identified in 1997 when an A(H5N1) clade 0 virus in the Gs/GD lineage in Hong Kong SAR, China caused disease outbreaks in poultry in farms and markets as well as severe disease in humans. In several cases there was some evidence of limited onward transmission in humans and this event raised concerns that it might be the beginning of a human influenza pandemic. Despite the successful efforts to eradicate this particular strain, other viruses within this lineage persisted and evolved in China, becoming more adept at infecting domestic ducks. By 2003 spread of these viruses via wild birds and live bird trade occurred across East and Southeast Asia, resulting in additional zoonotic infection in humans [link].The important role of wild birds in the transmission of these viruses over long distances became apparent in 2005 when a Gs/GD virus (clade 2.2) spread, primarily via wild birds, across Eurasia, and parts of Africa from western China. Most high-income countries eliminated this virus from poultry, but it persisted in several low and middle- income countries. Viruses within the Gs/GD lineage continued to evolve and spread. Additional intercontinental waves of transmission have occurred with the two most significant being those in 2014 (clade 2.3.4.4c) and from 2016 onwards (clade 2.3.4.4b) that also resulted in spread of these viruses to North America (2014-15 and 2021-22), with the latest outbreak extending through central and South America and to sub-Antarctic islands. These waves involved multiple N subtypes.In 2022/2023, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused extensive infection in coastal seabirds and mass die- offs of numerous ecologically important wild bird species.For an updated list of bird species affected with A(H5Nx) see HEREAmong the other Gs/GD virus clades that remain endemic in specific areas are clade 2.3.2.1a H5N1 viruses that have persisted in South Asia since 2010 and rarely associated with disease in humans.Clade 2.3.2.1c/e viruses have been present in Indonesia since 2012 and related viruses are still circulating in Cambodia, Viet Nam and Lao People’s Democratic Republic with nine recent human cases, four of which were fatal recorded in Cambodia.For an updated list of confirmed human cases with A(H5N1) see HEREIn addition, more than 80 human cases have been associated with clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5Nx/y) and 2.3.4.4h A(H5N6) viruses with most of these occurring in 2021 and 2022.Clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) viruses have caused few human cases but have resulted in multiple mammalian cases including aquatic mammals.For an updated list of mammalian species affected with A(H5Nx) see HERE
Avian origin H3N8 LPAIAn Influenza A(H3N8) virus lineage emerged in live bird markets in southern China in mid 2021 [link]. Since then, three human cases of Influenza A(H3N8) have been reported: In April 2022, the first human clinical case associated with this lineage was reported in Henan Province, China and was associated with severe disease. In May 2022, a 5-year-old boy was diagnosed with a mild influenza A(H3N8) infection in Changsha City, Hunan Province, China. On 27 March 2023, a third human case was reported from Guangdong Province, China in a 56-year-old female with underlying illneses who subsequently died.One of the A(H3N8) viruses isolated from a human was found to be transmissible by air in ferrets [link] but no evidence of sustained human transmission has been reported.
H7N4 LPAI (2017)One human case in China with reported exposure to poultry.
H7N9 LPAI (2013) & HPAI (2017)Reported only in China with over 1 000 human cases between 2013 and 2017 with a marked increase in 2017 compared to previous waves.Most human cases exposed in live bird markets.Nation-wide vaccination campaign in poultry since Sep 2017: Last reported human case in 2019 [link]. See FAO H7N9 situation update
H9N2 LPAIFirst human case reported in 1998.To date, about 100 influenza A(H9N2) human cases diagnosed worldwide, many of them were reported from China since December 2015. Most cases mild and involving children. Only two fatal cases reported [link]Endemic in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, a cause of significant production losses and mortalities in poultry production systems.Three major lineages and multiple genotypes.
H10Nx LPAITo date, two influenza A(H10N3) human infections have been reported globally [link]. In May 2021, the first case in Jiangsu Province, China [link], in September 2022, a second case in Zhejiang Province, China [link]The first influenza A(H10N5) human infection was reported in Zhejiang Province, China [link].
Influenza A(H10N7) infection have been reported in humans in 2004 in Egypt [link] and in 2010 in Australia [link].Since 2013, three influenza A(H10N8) human infections have been reported in Jiangxi Province, China.

Recommendations for affected countries and those at risk

FAO recommends intensified surveillance and awareness raising by national authorities.

General recommendations
It is important to report sick or dead birds – both wild birds and poultry – or wild mammals to local authorities (veterinary services, public health officials, community leaders etc.). These should be tested for avian influenza viruses.

Recommendations to poultry producers
Farmers and poultry producers should step up their biosecurity measures in order to prevent potential virus introduction from wild birds or their faeces.

Recommendations to hunters
Hunting associations and wildlife authorities should be aware that avian influenza viruses might be present in waterfowl and some other species hunted and that hunting, handling and dressing of shot game carries the risk of spreading avian influenza viruses to susceptible poultry.

Recommendations to national authorities
Increase surveillance efforts for the early detection of influenza viruses in poultry and dead wild species including certain mammals.

For full recommendations including non-avian species please see [link].

Important links

Source : FAO, 2024

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